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Since its initial bailout by the EU, IMF and the European Central Bank in 2009, Greece has
struggled to implement the agreed measures. Theofanis Exadaktylos and Nikos
Zahariadis write that declining levels of public trust across Greek political institutions mean
that the government’s efforts at reform will continue to be ineffective. They argue that a
long-term change in cultural paradigms is needed to embed trust and enable reforms to take
place.
Since 2009, the Greek government has been accused on many occasions by its
international creditors of  intensif ying the public debt crisis due to its reluctance and
inability to implement measures agreed upon through the international bailout
agreements. The Greek government has of ten given the response that targets have been
missed due to the higher than anticipated extent of  the economic recession. We disagree
with both sides of  this argument. Instead, building on case study research f rom Greece
and on the implementation process f ramework by Daniel Mazmanian and Paul Sabatier,
we argue that because polit ical trust underpins the government’s poor implementation
track record, lower levels of  trust decrease administrative capacity and widen problem intractability –
creating a vicious cycle of  non-cooperation and economic recession.
Although many measures included in the f irst and second bailout packages were demanded by non-
Greek actors and certain variables, such as economic growth, partly depended on the global economic
environment; the Greek government undertook the sovereign responsibility to f aithf ully execute the
provisions in the agreement. We f ocused on the domestic dimensions of  implementation not because we
discounted the importance of  external f actors, but because we were seeking to gain analytical tractability
on the domestic components of  implementation.
At the same time, there are a number of  alternative
explanations about the f ailure of  the implementation process.
There is a f undamental dif f erence, however, between
outcome and init iative. Parameters such as poor leadership,
bad design of  policy strategies, social resistance and internal
party and government polit ics play a role in the outcome of
the implementation process; however, polit ical trust is the
underlying variable that justif ies the presence of  the above
parameters within the implementation process outcomes. In
other words, everything starts f rom trust in the polit ical ability
of  the government to track down problems and provide viable
solutions that account f or a posit ive overall welf are f or
stakeholders. Trust def ines and af f ects the dissemination of
strategy signals to social groups and other stakeholders
(minimising social resistance) and polit ical partners (diminishing internal and external polit ical opposition).
In our simple game theoretic model, clarity, duration and commitment become the building blocks of  trust
that link the various implementation components together. 
Polit ical Trust and Policy Implementation 
Implementation is a negotiation game between the government, state agencies, and cit izens. In t imes of
austerity, these negotiations become asymmetric between those three parties because inf ormation and
compliance is imposed f rom the top (government). Hence, when the pie shrinks in a recession, we can
view society ‘as a zero-sum game between conf licting groups’. Policy-making becomes adversarial and
implementation breaks down because parties f ind litt le reason to cooperate. Polit ical trust f acilitates
cooperation between deciders, means, and targets, making implementation success more likely. We have
examined how (mis)trust can weaken the ef f ects of  policy-making between actors. Since polit ical trust
underpins the protests, lower trust diminishes administrative capacity and problem tractability,
accelerating the downward spiral of  implementation f ailure.
What conditions build greater polit ical trust in implementation and how does trust af f ect implementation
success? Institutional rational choice theory argues that trust will rise through three mechanisms: (a) by
increasing inf ormation and clarity of  goals; (b) with compliance in terms of  corrective action and
enf orcement rules; and (c) with repeated interactions over t ime that increase reputations and
trustworthiness.
As shown in Figure 1, Eurobarometer data f or Greece shows an overall decline of  trust in polit ical
institutions, be they executive, legislative or judiciary. It is interesting to observe that polit ical trust
altogether diminishes in Greece f or government and is (practically) non-existent f or polit ical parties at
the height of  the crisis in 2010. As f or the courts, the exposed f ailure to implement the law or hold
polit ical f igures accountable and responsible f or the country’s predicament can be the reason behind the
drop in trust.
Figure 1 – Public trust in Greek institutions 2005-2012
Source: Eurobarometer (data f or legal system unavailable between Feb 2010 and Feb 2012)
In Greece, contrary to our modeling expectations, and despite the constant negotiations between social
groups and the government, levels of  trust seem to decrease as polit ical agents are captured by the
social and prof essional cliques, and government actors keep changing the rules of  the game (i.e. low
problem tractability). At the same time there was a climate of  suspicion between social groups and the
government leading to the repudiation of  the polit ical system and ef f ectively to f urther non-compliance
and implementation f ailure, as well as a ‘spiral of  cynicism and disillusionment’ as the state struggled to
regain the trust of  its cit izens.
Certainly the enormity of  proposed changes in the case of  Greece elevated the dif f iculty of
implementation and the unwillingness or inability of  government to f rame the issues in ways that
generate trust lessened its ability to convince target populations that ref orms would pay of f . Success in
implementation depends largely (though not exclusively) on the ability of  polit icians to generate trust by
living up to the polit ical consequences of  their actions. Our case studies show that even in t imes of
extreme austerity, the norms of  protecting ‘special’ or electorally pivotal social and prof essional groups
persisted and were well-embedded into the polit ical system.
The state of play: have we come full circle? 
At the height of  the crisis in Greece, the government f ailed repeatedly to f ulf ill its promises, become an
honest broker among negotiating parties, and synthesise dif f erent points of  view in promoting the
common interest. Moreover, there was a long-term structural relationship between polit ical corruption
and implementation, which involved the absence of  a sense of  obligation towards the state and the
common good. This gap that can be bridged by inf using trust among agents becomes more important
than honesty as such. Trust cannot be increased by simply doing away with dishonest leaders or
bureaucracies and replacing them with a new set of  people. Only a change of  cultural paradigms that
embed notions of  trust within the implementation processes can do so. Otherwise even if  society
becomes less corrupt it does not necessarily mean that it will become more trusting. Undoubtedly, this is
not a short- term policy implication but it involves enduring commitments and ef f orts that are dif f icult in
periods of  austerity and social crisis.  
What is the state of  play in Greece now? Af ter a long time, when the polit ical leadership of ten accused
the European partners of  inertia, international trust has returned to Greece. At the beginning of
December, the Eurogroup released the next bailout tranche evaluating the Greek austerity programme
positively. Shortly af ter, Standard and Poor’s provided the country with a vote of  conf idence upgrading
the credit rating of  Greece f rom junk to B-/B, and the European Central Bank started to accept Greek
bonds as collateral, leading to a sharp drop in interest rate yields to a low of  two years. International
trust is only one part of  the equation, and as long as the Greek government cannot turn the climate of
polit ical trust around in the domestic realm, the structural rigidit ies of  the past will continue to dominate
the public policy-making process and delay the success of  implementation and change in Greece.
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